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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON MEXICAN SECURED
TRANSACTION LAWS*
MODERATOR: MICHAEL L. OWEN, ESQ.**
Panelists: Lic. Carlos Aiza Haddad; Lic. Anthony Mccarthy
KRUMBEIN: This question is for Mr. Aiza on the prenda mercantil'. I have
two quick questions. First, what happens to the non-recourse concept if you have
either a cosigner or guarantor? Second, can you elect to execute on a promissory
note to get around the issue of executing on the prenda?
AIZA: Actually, that is one of the most interesting parts of what we have been
analyzing. I think your questions are related. As a general matter, there are two
theories: I agree with one of them and I have only heard about the other. First, there
is the basic theory, a secondary obligation, such as the obligation of a guarantor, is
an accessory, meaning that its existence is dependent upon the existence of the
principal obligation. To the extent there is legal remittance, or cancellation of the
indebtedness by virtue of the non-recourse statute, then the guaranty would be
equally terminated or equally reduced. Again, the idea is that it follows the nature
of the principal obligation.
There is also an interesting theory that goes something like this: the obligation
continues to exist and the statute only affects the enforceability of the obligation.
Therefore, the creditor might be unable to enforce its right against the principal
obligor. In the statute, the nonrecourse provision refers only to the settlor or debtor,
and does not relate to the guarantor. So, if you agree with this theory, hopefully it
will be addressed in court soon, only the enforceability right of the lender, and not
the obligation of the debtor, is affected by the non-recourse obligation. So, perhaps
there is recourse against the guarantor. I personally doubt it.
Now, on the negotiable instrument side we saw quite a few different drafts of the
amendment that did not contain Article 4122, which on the trust side is a nonrecourse problem, or the concept of the avalista. If you do have a promissory note,
apagar6,that is made by the principal obligor and then guaranteed by an avalista,
the particular nature of the obligation of the avalista,as opposed to the obligation
of an ordinary guarantor, is quite different. It is an independent obligation. It is not
a joint obligor but rather a new obligor or a different obligor. The conclusion we
arrived at was that Article 412 with the nonrecourse effect does not in any way
reduce or terminate or invalidate or affect the obligations of the avalista. The
avalistawould continue to be held liable for the full amount. In practice this would
mean you pursue recourse against the assets since you cannot really go against the
debtor, or collect from the proceeds of the sale of the assets. If there were a
deficiency, you would seek payment of that deficiency against the avalista, which

* The views expressed here are the panelists' own, and should not be taken to represent those of their
employers or other organizations with whom they may be affiliated.
** A summary of the background of each of the participants in this panel follows on the last page of the
panel discussion.
1. The prendamercantilunder Mexican commercial law traditionally provided that an enforceable pledge
of collateral required transfer of possession ofthe collateral to the creditor whereas the amended secured transaction
provisions provide explicitly that the prenda sin transmision de posesion creates an enforceable pledge of the
collateral as security for the debt without transfer of possession of the collateral as recognized under Article Nine
of the United States Uniform Commercial Code.
2. Ley General de Tftulos y Operaciones de Cr6dito, Artfculo 412.
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does not follow the rule that the secondary obligation follows the primary obligation
because the obligation of an avalista is not a secondary obligation but rather a
primary obligation.
STEPHENSON: Let me give you a hypothetical. Suppose that a U.S. lender
makes a loan to both a Mexican company, that is a subsidiary of a U.S. company,
and to a U.S. company. Assume that both sign as borrowers. In addition, the U.S.
lender makes a direct loan to the Mexican company. Afideicomiso de garantiasis
put in place, so that now you have thefideicomiso de garantiasguaranteeing the
debt of the U.S. company. What happens to the obligation in the U.S. when you
have a separate debt obligation if the assets of the trust are sufficient to cover the
direct debt of the Mexican obligation and would have an additional amount
available? Can that additional amount be applied to the debt owed in the U.S.,
where there was a guaranty from the Mexican company?
AIZA: First of all, the benefit of the non-recourse monster is really only for the
debtor. The actual statute does not even talk about the settlor of the trust, which
may be a person different than the debtor. It just talks about the debtor. The issue
that we discussed about the guarantor is really just a consequence of the nature of
the obligation of the guarantor. Now, the concept here is that assets held in the trust
cannot secure any obligation other than the original obligation for which they were
transferred into the trust. Now, I think that to the extent that you can establish that
they are related transactions and that the lenders were induced to conduct, for
example, the transaction that you had mentioned in the U.S., that transaction was
done by virtue of the guaranty trust. They are a package deal, if you will. Then I
think, to the extent that there are excess assets in the trust, it could be possible to
conclude that those could be used to satisfy payment of the obligation of the U.S.
company.
I think the issue really works the other way around. To the extent that the assets
that are held in the trust are sufficient, without the amendments, the trust agreement
works very well. It could be used for whatever purpose you can think of. Again,
that includes the satisfaction of another obligation of an affiliate company of the
settlor of the trust if it was originally contemplated in setting up the trust.
The issue again becomes complicated when a U.S. borrower is the settlor of a
trust in respect to assets that it holds in Mexico. A U.S. company transfers assets
under Mexican law, because they are physically located in Mexico, into a trust as
collateral for an obligation that it has with a U.S. lender. New York law governs
the documents, and the only point of contact with Mexico is the situs of the
collateral. The question that I have for the New York lawyers, or the U.S. lawyers
generally, is if Article 412 were to be examined by a New York or a U.S. judge,
assuming that there is a deficiency, would he or she say that your collateral security
agreements were governed by Mexican law? Or, will he or she say the loan
documents are governed by U.S. law and under U.S. law this is a full recourse
obligation and you are required to pay the full amount? Therefore, would a U.S.
court actually enforce the judgment against the U.S. company with respect to assets
that are not located in Mexico? This way, a Mexican court will never really have
anything to say about the matter. I think that is a very interesting question, for
which I have never received a straight answer. Maybe someone could share his or
her views with us on this point.
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STEPHENSON: If I might impose one more. Suppose the assets of the
guaranty trust were set up to cover both the obligations of the Mexican company
and to guaranty the debt of the U.S. company. It was a Mexican company that
owned the assets. If the assets are insufficient to pay the Mexican company's direct
debt, does that mean you argue that the U.S. company has no obligation because the
creditor has no rights at all?
AIZA: I think so. Again, I do not think that is in spirit of what the legislature
intended. I fail to see or understand what they intended on many grounds of this
amendment. But in particular, I think it makes sense when you talk about the
settlor, to the extent that the settlor of the trust and the debtor are the same person,
and that this cancellation of indebtedness or this non-recourse benefit applies to that
person. Nothing is said in the statute about the possibility, which is quite common
in Mexico, of having the settlor of the trust be one person, and the debtor another
person. As to who has the benefit of the non-recourse obligation, the statute says
the debtor does. So in your example, Mr. Stephenson, I think you are talking about
two different debtors, one is a Mexican company, the other one is a U.S. company.
Only the Mexican company is transferring assets into the trust. But the benefit of
the non-recourse obligation is strange, since it arises from a collateral document as
opposed to the principal document. The collateral document says that if these assets
are not sufficient to pay the secured obligations, then the debtor is relieved from
those obligations. It actually does not say the debtor is relieved from the obligation;
it says the lender loses its right to enforce the collection of any deficiency.
ORLANDO LOERA: Let me see if I got this right. I can avoid the non-recourse
problem by having an aval?
AIZA: Perhaps.
LOERA: Okay. So I grab the assets, transfer them to a special purpose vehicle
create the lien and get an aval from the borrower.
AIZA: Correct.
LOERA: Will it work?
AIZA: Perhaps. There is reason to believe that it should work. However, it has
not been tested.
ALCOCER: It is very interesting how things ended up with this reform. I
consistently agree with what Licenciado Aiza has said. There is, however, a need
for a solution. Sometimes we are going back to the old ways we used to protect
secured interests. For example, you could use an industrial mortgage, which creates
a lien on every single piece of property and asset of a corporation. You could also
do either a double lien with a guaranty trust dealing with certain parts of the assets,
or a lien on the intangible assets, such as other intellectual property rights you may
have. In addition to that, you have the personal guaranty. So, if you put these
options in a basket, what do you suggest to a person that is basically trying to just
get the right guaranty and perfect it to the end based upon your credit examination?
Probably the conclusion is to request personal guaranties and select these through
the new ways of perfecting security interests, or the mechanisms that allow you to
choose on which guaranty you execute first. Would you first go to the personal
guaranty and leave at least these floaters, considering the fact that you may not
collect on them because either the value of what you put in and pledged was not
enough for payment?
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AIZA: Let me try to address your question from two different perspectives.
First, what I think is being done in practice is to go around the amendments and
simply put aside the concept of the floating lien pledge, because the floating lien
pledge did not really damage anything. It is there and if people want to use it, fine;
if they don't, they don't. But the guaranty trust agreement amendments were quite
dramatic. They affected the way in which business was being conducted before the
amendment in a very serious way. So what is being done in practice is, first, to stay
away from the concept of the guaranty trust agreement to the extent that, as in most
cases, the parties do not intend to have a non-recourse-type transaction. Second, the
trust agreement is being used for different purposes. Licenciado Loera touched
upon one of them a little while ago, which involves negative pledge-type purposes
and the segregation of assets. The trust continues to be used, but the key factor is
to make sure that the trust is not in any way interpreted or construed as a guaranty
trust agreement. Typically, the assets are transferred and the purpose is simply
stated as management. There are no default provisions, no early acceleration and
no sale. But it is still useful for other reasons.
Additionally, people are also going back to the old forms of security interest. We
are working on a transaction now, for example, that involves a telecom company.
There is a specific form of security interest under the telecom statutes called
mortgage security, which is a particular kind of security interest that attaches to a
lot of assets. If that is not available, then you go to an ordinary mortgage in the
context of real estate. You use a commercial pledge, an ordinary commercial
pledge with the possessory problem. Then you try to deal with things the way that
they were dealt with before the guaranty trust agreement was really being used.
Again, the purpose of these amendments has been entirely defeated. They are
pushing practitioners to go back to what was used in the past instead of affording
new options, which is what the actual Exposici6n de Motivos says. Now what I
would do to solve the problem is anything I can. I see some important personalities
in the legal community here who could do what our counterparts in the United
States did. It is the right time to join forces as a group and talk to our legislators
and make sure they understand that the amendments are not working. In the
context, for example, of the trust, they completely destroyed its legal concept and
nature under Mexican law with the amendment. So, I think it is important to work
with the bankers in the efforts that they have started. That may be somewhat
dangerous because bankers always have Mr. Barzon and other people complaining
about anything the bankers say, even if it is completely right. So although there
may be smarter ways to go about it, we must get the legislators to change this back,
to use some of the amendments which are good and get rid of the bad ones to make
sure that the purposes are accomplished. We should not simply try to solve the
problems in practice by going back to the old forms of security interest. So, this is
an invitation to all the Mexican lawyers here: let us try to do something about this
and not just cross our arms and complain like we have been doing for the past
eighteen months.
SPANOGLE: Suppose there is a debtor located in Mexico with assets in the U.S.
The forms are filed in Mexico, maybe also in the District of Columbia. After the
assets are sold and there is still a deficiency, you bring your request for a deficiency
either directly to the Mexican courts or obtain an American judgment and seek
recognition of it in Mexico. Under the non-recourse agreement sections of the
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statute, will a Mexican court grant this deficiency or recognize the deficiency
judgment? If that turns out the way I think it might, suppose you go for the
deficiency judgment in an American court? Should it take into cognizance the fact
that a Mexican court might say there is no deficiency since you filed there? Have
we started importing Mexican law into the United States?
AIZA: I guess the short answer to the Mexican law side of the question is that
to the extent the parties did not enter into a specific guaranty trust agreement under
the new statute, if it is not something that in substance is a guaranty trust agreement
under the new statute, or a floating lien pledge or prenda sin transmisi6n de
posesi6n, then the non-recourse statute would not apply. As most of you know,
Mexican law looks to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the assets are physically
located to determine laws for attachment and perfection of security interests. The
interesting thing is that the revisions to Article 9 as I understand them, irrespective
of the situs of the assets, direct you to Mexican law if the principal place of business
of the borrower is in Mexico. Again, the interesting thing is that Mexico does
exactly the opposite. Last week, I had a discussion with a U.S. lawyer on what the
revisions to Article 9 are doing. Are they saying that if there is a filing system in
Mexico, we need to file in Mexico? If so, then we can just go ahead and file. That
has nothing to do, really, with the non-recourse aspect because all we are doing is
filing a New York law-governed security agreement, for example. However, as I
understand it, the revisions to Article 9 direct the parties to look to Mexico for
perfection rules as opposed to just a simple filing. I think what the revisions say is
if the principal place of business of the borrower is Mexico, irrespective of the situs
of the assets, we will look to Mexican law to determine if a security interest is duly
perfected or not. That triggers a very interesting discussion as to what that means,
because we have a possessory system as far as movable assets are concerned, and
the only case in which we record in the context of a pledge is under this new
commercial pledge and other very exceptional cases. Typically it is a question of
possession. So, if a U.S. lawyer asks me, are we perfected even if we did not file?
The answer is most probably going to be yes so long as we hold possession, so that
the lender or a person other than the debtor holds possession of the asset.
OWEN: I would like to respond to the second part of Professor Spanogle's
question. The test for perfection under Article 9 is whether the foreign country
where the borrower is organized has a general registration requirement to record
non-possessory liens. Although people may disagree with me, I think the answer
in Mexico would be no. In that case, I think you would want to perfect in both
Mexico and in the U.S. by filing in the District of Columbia. Now, getting to
Professor Spanogle' s example, it would seem to me that you would want to develop
a security interest that covers the property in the U.S. You would have a security
agreement that you would file in the District of Columbia. Then you would have
a guaranty trust, or whatever you have in Mexico that specifically covers property
in Mexico. Then I would see no reason why you could not enforce your security
interest in the U.S. property, and it should not be tainted by the non-recourse
provision in Mexico. Now, problems could arise if the collateral is not tangible
property and you somehow need the cooperation of the debtor to foreclose, and you
go ahead and get a judgment in the U.S. You would have to bring that judgment
down to Mexico and have it enforced. Then we get to the question of whether a
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Mexican judge would enforce a judgment based on U.S. security documents. My
answer is, he should. I do not know whether he would, but I think he should.
AIZA: I would agree with you that he should, so long as there is not a Mexican
guaranty trust agreement or floating lien pledge securing the same obligation.
Again, if you have a series of different security interests in different jurisdictions
and you do not have a Mexican component such as a Mexican guaranty trust
agreement or floating lien pledge agreement, a Mexican court should definitely
enforce that foreign judgment. However, if you do have a guaranty trust agreement
or a floating lien pledge agreement in Mexico that has been foreclosed on, and there
continues to be a deficiency, a Mexican judge should not enforce a foreign
judgment for the deficiency because public policy dictates that the parties should
not be able to waive the provision. So, again, a Mexican judge in that particular
case would not or should not enforce that foreign judgment.
OWEN: So I think the important qualification from Licenciado Aiza is that you
need to split the debt. Not only have separate security interests but also split the
debt.
AIZA: Right.
MACPHERSON: I thought that Mexico was creating a system to register or to
file or record all security interests, and that you would be able to look up through
the computer and find out if there was any prior claim against the asset. The
discussion here gives me the impression that you are of the opinion there is no
recording system and there will not be a recording system.
AIZA: That is a very good question, and I am glad we can clarify this point. As
a matter of fact, there is a recording system in Mexico, and there has been for many,
many years. I think again that is fairly universal in civil law countries. However,
in the context of a security interest that is created with respect to movable property,
the perfection requirement is typically by means of possession as opposed to filing.
For example, in the context of real estate, by definition, the requirement for
perfection is filing in the context of a mortgage and there is a public registry of
property that is there specifically for that purpose. There is also a public registry
of commerce where corporate-type matters concerning companies are registered.
Things such as a deed of incorporation, powers of attorney, certain resolutions and
certain kinds of security interests on movable property may be recorded in the
public registry. Now, under the new statute with the floating lien pledge, for
perfection purposes, the perfection mechanism there changes from possession to
filing. There is a registration system already set up. Perhaps what you heard about
as far as a computer system is that they are revamping the systems and making them
somewhat more modern. Somejurisdictions have done a pretty goodjob about that,
and you do have access or will have better access in the near future to understand
what the status of assets of a particular debtor are in real estate and in movable
property to a certain extent. However, the possession requirement continues to be
generally the most important for moveable property.
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